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INTRODUCTION
While T. Veblen has been recognized for being one of the leading found-
ers of the American Institutionalist School, along with Commons and 
Mitchell, he is also considered today as one of the precursors of modern 
evolutionary economics (Veblen, 1898; David, 1985; Hodgson, 1994). His eco-
nomic analysis has also received some attention. Notably, Veblen has made 
significant contributions both to microeconomics, with a theory of the 
firm and of some social interactions, and to macroeconomics, with a busi-
ness cycle theory. More specifically, it is admitted that Veblen’s business 
cycle theory was an early attempt to consider the primary underpinning 
of fluctuations in the relationship between current capitalization and 
anticipated earning capacity.
Many authors have already defended that a business cycle theory can 
be developed from Veblen’s ideas, even if it is incomplete, admittedly 
not very systematic and lacking rigorousness 1. A relationship between 
Veblen’s theory and other business cycle theories in the perspective of the 
history of economic thought can be outlined, e.g., Aftalion’s, Lescure’s, 
1 There is an extensive review of the secondary literature and an analysis of the 
business cycle in Mendez’s thesis (2012, pp. 117-177). 
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Fisher’s and Mitchell’s approaches. Under a theory of actual overcapitali-
zation, Aftalion explained the  duration of cycle with the joint role of pro-
duction delays and the accelerator mechanism. Veblen also underlined 
time-lag phenomenon in economic process, firstly related to the distance 
of firms from the point of distortion, which implies that they are not 
all affected by changes in price at the same time. But the originality of 
Veblen’s analysis is above all the insistence on the time of contracts’ exe-
cution (Pirou, 1946, p. 81). Veblen shared with Lescure–and many other 
theorists of their time–the assumption that a close relationship exists 
between the fluctuation of capitalization and the confidence in poten-
tial profits (Mitchell, 1927, p. 88). Although Veblen shared Fisher’s concep-
tion of capital as an entity whose primary importance depends on its abil-
ity to generate future incomes, he had not taken into account the specific 
role of interest rates in Fisher’s theory (Dimand, 1998). Then, according to 
Veblen, (1) the origin of crises depends less on interest rate changes than 
on an anticipation of the earning-capacities of different types of assets, 
and (2) the main issue is that the magnitude of fluctuations affects capi-
talization values more than production volumes. From this point of view, 
the theory of business cycle that has the most common features with that 
of Veblen is Mitchell’s much-known one. In the latter case, Mitchell was 
explicitly inspired by Veblen’s conceptions of economic behavior, economic 
methodology, and above all by his so-called institutionalism (Rutherford, 
2000) and evolutionism (Sherman, 2001). Like Veblen, Mitchell consid-
ered that business cycles demonstrate that the processes of making and 
distributing goods are mainly organized under the business principles of 
making profit. And like Veblen too, Mitchell described the business cycle 
as an endogenous process with the institutions of capitalist economy: 
“Mitchell showed that all the institutions of the pecuniary economy market exchange, 
production for profit, and money–must be present if there is to be a business cycle” 
(Sherman, 2001, p. 86).
In the field of more contemporary history of economic thought, Dimand 
considered that Veblen’s theory echoed Tobin’s and Minsky’s financial 
instability theories (Dimand, 2004). Moreover, Veblen’s conceptions provide 
enough originality to be used as a reference by some contemporary authors 
in the macroeconomic field. They refer to the tradition that “can be traced at 
least as far back as Veblen who described the positive interactions between asset prices 
and collateralized borrowing” (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, p. 24) and then could 
be considered as the “first financial cycle theory” (Toporowski, 2005).
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Veblen’s endeavor to provide a 
consistent theory of business cycles and then to examine the actual type 
of theory being forwarded. In this perspective, we outline that Veblen 
endeavors to explain institutional factors and evolutionary mechanisms. 
The first section will offer an understanding emphasizing the institu-
tional dimension underlying Veblen’s theory. The second section will pre-
sent the business cycle and crises according to Veblen. The third section 
will focus on determining if his conception of the business cycle can be 
classified as exogenous or endogenous, and if the fluctuations considered 
are monetary or real. The final section will propose an interpretation 
highlighting the evolutionary mechanisms, with an investigation of the 
nature of disequilibrium processes in economic cycles. We will show that 
connections can be made with some contemporary multi-agents models 
simulating financial crises.
1. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Veblen is known to be one of the founders of institutionalism in econom-
ics. He wanted to analyze economic facts from institutions rather than 
from rational individual actors. Therefore, for Veblen, it was necessary 
to reject universal and timeless explanations and to adopt historical con-
textualization. In Veblen’s perspective, the institutions that organize eco-
nomic life defined as the “settled habits of thought common to the generality of 
men”, and therefore mold the nature of expectations of actors. They are 
thus essential to understanding economic processes. Thus, in this sec-
tion, we propose a presentation of the historical and institutional context 
within which Veblen’s business cycle theory takes place.
Under Veblen’s conception, an economic phenomenon is to a certain extent 
history-specific, which is explained by the institutions prevailing at the 
time. Therefore, the modern crises Veblen witnessed did not display the 
same symptoms or characteristics as the previous ones. Price rises dur-
ing the “old regime” meant disequilibrium, whereas under the “new regime” 
decreasing prices suggested hard times. Moreover, endogenous business 
cycles replaced crashes and accidental disruptions as a result of modern 
capitalism’s institutions. In his 1904 book, Veblen considered that after 
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1873, the capitalist system was confined to a long depression trend with 
shorter cycle phases. The regular alternation of prosperity and depression 
was relegated to the period between 1816 and 1873. According to his anal-
ysis, fluctuations showed no real regularity before 1816, and this for two 
main reasons. First, the industrial system was not adequately connected 
to allow for the fast transmission of disturbances throughout the econ-
omy. Second, before 1816, the technological system was not yet very well-
developed. Thus, technical progress is a factor in the continuous fall in 
costs, and the fall in prices is a primary explanatory element in Veblen’s 
conception of economic depression, as we will see after. Therefore, before 
1816 economic disturbances were essentially speculative crashes that did 
not deeply affect the area of production. Crises could also be experienced 
as a result of external causes, such as crop devastation or war. In these 
cases, no cyclical movement of economic data occurred. After 1873, on the 
contrary, Veblen stated that the economic system was in a state of chronic 
depression. The recovery stages were more heavily compressed and less 
frequent. During this period, technological progress was dramatic, yet 
exerted tremendous pressure on older industries that did not benefit from 
the fall in costs. From that time, the business cycle became endogenous. 
“The true”, asserted Veblen, “or what may be called the normal, crises, depressions 
and exaltations in the business world are not the result of accidents, such as the fail-
ure of a crop. They come in the regular course of business. The depression and the exal-
tation are in a measure bound together” (Veblen, 1904, p. 183).
Veblen pointed out a historical disruption in the economic institutions, 
which made finance appear as a major and central feature for production 
and for competition strength, marked by the development of joint stock 
companies and the concentration of capital supported by powerful invest-
ment banks. From Veblen’s point of view, at least two significant changes 
should be noticed: the change in the nature of capital, and the change 
in the management of firms. Thus, a major shift occurred in the concep-
tion of capital and of its property, which was no more conceived as a set 
of physical assets but as financial assets. With incorporeal and intangible 
assets constituting companies’ goodwill, capitalists’ ownership no longer 
concerned the physical assets of production, but securities, and the main 
capital property was its “earning-capacity”. Moreover, competition not only 
occurred in the goods markets, but also in the assets markets. In this eco-
nomic pattern, “recourse to credit becomes the general practice, the regular course 
of competitive business management, and competition goes on the basis of such a use 
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of credit as an auxiliary to the capital in hand” (Veblen, 1904, p. 97) 2. Veblen then 
emphasized the growing distinction between industrial capital and busi-
ness capital as a main feature of modern capitalism. From Veblen’s point 
of view, the growth of finance is the main cause of instability even if “it 
has been customary to approach the problem from the side of the industrial phenom-
ena involved – the mechanical facts of production and consumption; rather than from 
the side of business enterprise – the phenomena of prices, earnings, and capitalization” 
(Veblen, 1904, p. 184-5).
Another feature of capitalism of Veblen’s time that must be noted is a sep-
aration, within firms, between technical and productive functions on 
the one hand, and from financial and commercial functions on the other 
hand. Such was not the case during the early stage of capitalism, these 
functions being unified in the hands of captains of industry. The prob-
lem then stemmed from the fact that the separated functions were related 
to the criterion of economic efficiency, which were at least different, if 
not altogether divergent. According to “industrial experts”, the goal of firms 
was to “make goods”. But according to the “captain of finance”, it was to “make 
money”. Why have these aspirations not always overlapped? Because they 
did not necessarily rely on the same conception of “value”. The industrial 
conception is grounded in the use value of production, i.e., product qual-
ity and abundant output. Business’s conception is grounded in “exchange 
or scarcity value”, i.e., maximum unit price, even if the margin is obtained 
through output restrictions or reduced product quality. Thus, two meas-
ures of value can be distinguished, the industrial one quantifying the con-
tribution to the conditions of living in a given society, and the market 
value, which only depends on differential monetary gains.
2 In this perspective, Veblen distinguishes his proposal from that of Tougan-
Baranowski (Tougan-Baranowski, 1913), in which he did, however, recognize some 
acute observations and theories. From Marx’s analysis of industrial sectors, i.e., pro-
duction goods industries and consumption goods industries, Tougan-Baranowski 
stated that an excessive accumulation of capital equipment and an even income dis-
tribution were responsible for lapses from prosperity into depression. According to 
this position, crises are connected with the “material process of economic life (production 
and consumption)” (Veblen, 1904, p. 185, footnote 1). While admitting the strategic role 
of production goods industries, Veblen nevertheless sought to ground his own expla-
nation of fluctuations in terms of business principles, i.e., in terms of money and 
prices more than in terms of production and consumption.
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Moreover, for Veblen, dissimilarity in value conceptions had grown with 
an increasing use, within firms, of financing by means of credit and finan-
cial markets. This modality of financing was coupled with the control of 
firms by majority shareholders becoming “absentee ownership”–financial 
goals taking precedence over industrial purposes. Namely, in modern capi-
talism, decision-making authority is held by majority shareholders focused 
on goodwill and acting as absentee owners and creditors: “Since business has 
become the central and controlling interest, the question of welfare has become a ques-
tion of price” (Veblen, 1904, p. 177). Therefore, “industry is controlled by business 
exigencies and is carried on for business ends” (ibid, p. 210). Then, the determining 
factor of the business is no less the physical capital accumulation than the 
conditions of competition orchestrating financial returns and pay backs.
Veblen considered that the habits of thought formed by the institutions 
of economic systems led the capitalist system of his times to favor the 
principles of financial business. Whereas technical progress is a poten-
tial beneficial factor in terms of living conditions, it turns out that the 
business system makes it an element which adversely affects monetary 
profit. The so-called inter-institutional conflict between industrial and 
pecuniary principles is in fact a great disturbance-generating factor. The 
“inordinate productivity of the modern machine process” actually undermines 
the business base within the framework of a market economy with sharp 
competition. Technical progress drives output volumes and productivity 
higher. Businessmen seek to set prices at the point of maximum net rev-
enue. However, the price level is fixed by the scarcity principle of value, 
and the businessmen are concerned that oversupply will reduce profits. 
This problem is acute since, in a competitive market structure, the aggre-
gate volume of production is not controlled by any individual firm. Strong 
levels of industrial productivity create distortions in economy and under-
mine price and profit growth.
At this historical time marked by its specific institutions–a sustained pace 
of technological evolution, the money and credit economy and sharp com-
petition–the economic system, subject to contradictions, was very unstable 
and did not conceal an endogenous mechanism capable of restoring equi-
librium. Consequently, in the absence of a deus ex machina, “under the regime 
of the perfect machine industry and a perfect business organization, with active com-
petition throughout, it is at least probable that depression would not be seriously inter-
rupted by any other cause” (Veblen, 1904, p. 245).
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Having established the historical and institutional context, now let us 
consider the nature of the business cycle according to Veblen.
2. PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION  
IN VEBLEN’S BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY
This section proposes a restitution of the business cycle according to 
Veblen, notably from the author’s 1892 text, where he reinterprets Say’s 
law on the impossibility of a general overproduction by integrating the 
expectations of profit and the role of credit relationships.
The business cycle sequence can be restored from the prosperity phase, 
along with its inflationary trend. The upward phase of the cycle is char-
acterized by an increase in demand and in the selling prices of products 
for certain industries. Then the price rises extend from some individual 
firms to a broad segment of industries because of a different kind of inter-
dependence in the economic system. A two-stage prosperity can be dis-
cerned. During the first stage, an unfolding profit-anticipation bound is 
observable, grounded in the differential gain between rising output prices 
and costs which are increasing less rapidly. A differential advantage is 
also apparent for certain industries by virtue of their relative proximity 
to the origin of the positive price disturbance. In the context of growing 
importance of financial markets, optimistic anticipations enhance firms’ 
capitalization. This inflating capitalization, according to Veblen, is most 
heavily grounded in the anticipation of earning capacity and in goodwill 
rather than in the real value of firms’ tangible assets, which merely rises 
as a consequence and to a lesser extent. According to Mitchell, “this sequence 
of growing demand, rising prices, increasing expectations of profit and swelling capi-
talization, repeating itself on an ever-growing scale so long as its basis lasts - an antic-
ipated increase in demand or selling prices greater than the anticipated increase in 
costs” (Mitchell, 1927, p. 80). Notably, growing capitalization, which rep-
resents the collateral for loans, authorizes the expansion of credit and 
financial investments. The security behind such loans is the prospective 
net income, capitalized at the then-current rate of interest. In a context 
of competition, firms mainly use these loans to increase their property. 
In fact, indebtedness enables capitalistic control to increase the differen-
tial advantages of some firms from their competitors. The result is a rise 
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of financial liability of the firm, that is of business capital, but not of 
capacity of production. Then, distinguishing the two meanings of capital, 
Veblen said that “taken in the aggregate, the funds so added to business capital rep-
resent no material capital or production goods; they are capital only; they swell the 
volume of business, as counted in terms of price, but they do not directly swell the vol-
ume of industry” (Veblen 1904, p. 99).
During the second phase of the business cycle, the differential advantages 
decline both between output prices and input prices, and between rival 
firms. The expected rate of profit, incorporated in the offer price, does 
not occur for two reasons: (1) speculation may have caused too high profit 
expectations, and (2) lower production costs are induced by technologi-
cal innovations; “This divergence may be due to several different causes, but usu-
ally and mainly to two general ones, – a speculative movement, and an increased effi-
ciency of industry” (Veblen, 1892, p. 491). To the extent that price increases 
are the basis of profit expectations and assets evaluation, the fall in prices 
linked to technical progress is a turning point in the cycle. Without doubt, 
it is also a factor of differentiation of the firms according to whether they 
are affected by the improvement of the productivity: those that are “lag-
ging” to adjust their prices are those whose profit expectations are the 
most disappointed. So, “The actual present value of the property, as capitalised 
on the basis of its present earning capacity or on the cost of replacing it, falls short 
of its nominal, accepted value; and, as profits continue to be computed on the basis of 
this accepted nominal value, the rate of profit actually obtainable falls short of what 
is accepted as the customary and proper rate. The profit, computed on this basis, may 
even entirely disappear” (Veblen, 1892, pp. 489-490).
For Veblen, prosperity does not end abruptly, but instead is self-sustained 
and prolonged, with two mechanisms operating. The first one is the rela-
tive predominance of the financial fluctuations compared with the mate-
rial ones, this idea being often considered as Veblen’s specific conception 
and as an early announcement of later business cycles theories. The second 
mechanism is inertia due to the time of contract execution, which is rather 
original in business cycle conceptions (Pirou, 1946, p. 81). The first mech-
anism relies on the “shortsightedness” of economic agents. Businessmen 
are victims of a type of monetary illusion, the capitalization of industrial 
liabilities gets exaggerated by speculative anticipation, and the competi-
tion for industrial property leads to an inflationary effect on assets with 
a cumulative process: “for these creditors, too, like other men who live by and 
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under the price system, go on the assumption that money values are the final reality 
of things, and that they can lose nothing so long as the face value of their paper is undi-
minished and the solvency of the debtor impaired” (Veblen, 1923, p. 183). Collateral 
prices are consequently inflated, thus entailing an expansion of deben-
ture credit underwritten by these securities. For Veblen, the anticipations 
were a major factor in the process of expansion of values in the growing 
phase of the cycle. The second mechanism, which is inertia, depends on 
the time required to fulfill contracts. Most economic transactions, pur-
chasing, selling and all financial transactions are accomplished through 
contracts, the terms of which extend and perpetuate trends in price 
changes over time: “These contracts may be of the nature of loans, advances, out-
standing accounts, engagements for future delivery or future acceptance, but in the 
nature of the case they involve credit obligations” (ibid., p. 188). Even if difficul-
ties realizing the anticipated profits begin to appear, invoices must be paid 
at a previously fixed price, credits must be honored, preventing a rapid 
adjustment to the new conditions, etc.
Indeed, Veblen did not explain the turnaround mechanism to the depres-
sion and crisis phase with great precision (Mendez, 2012), this change 
being related to a decrease in differential advantages and in gains expec-
tations which are no longer realized. The divorce between expectations 
and effective profit becomes apparent. Production costs just keep pace 
with selling prices, and profits are trimmed. Moreover, an intensive use 
of credit transactions gives rise to a special cause and effect in the busi-
ness cycle process. Some creditors begin to think that firms’ capitalization 
is unreasonable, and a time of distrust sets in. If we use Mitchell’s words, 
“to bring on a general crisis, it needs but that some considerable creditors should con-
clude that the present earning capacity of his debtors no longer warrants the capital-
ization upon which their collateral is appraised” (Mitchell, 1927, p. 80). And if 
capital is borrowed, then “whenever the nominal owner of the means of produc-
tion is not also the real owner, as happens in the case of borrowed capital, he becomes 
answerable to the real owner – the lender – for any amount by which the actual pre-
sent value of the property may fall short of the accepted valuation”. Expectations 
turn away, and Veblen stated that “business depression and exaltation are, at 
least in their first incidence, of the nature of psychological fact, just as price move-
ment is a psychological phenomenon” (Veblen, 1904, p. 187). “Pyramidal” credit 
transactions, which represent one of the main features of modern capi-
talism, are the driving force behind recession and crisis. Securities are 
reduced to the point that any additional extension of credit can no longer 
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be supported, yet new credit becomes necessary for fulfilling contracts 
and paying back loans. Companies need new loans, but banks no longer 
want to lend because of their negative expectations about price move-
ments of goods and assets. The result of this credit crunch is insolvency, 
firms’ liquidation and forced sales. Credit ramifications prove to be so sig-
nificant that most creditors are often debtors as well. Businesses, pressed 
for payment, simply pass on the burden to other firms, and so on down 
the line. Consequently, bankruptcies multiply by calls for debt payoff. The 
early repayment of debts gives rise to depreciation of asset values and a 
reshuffling of industrial property in favor of creditors. For Veblen, coun-
tertrends are also present, thereby preventing against a collapse of the 
whole economy. But these countertrends remain external: a pool of cred-
itors or governmental organizations can lessen crash-sustaining credit to 
the benefit of certain critical industries.
In Veblen’s analysis, the adjustment for quantitative imprecision between 
supply and demand is not the main feature of the economic cycle. It is 
instead explained by the intrinsic financial instabilities of the capital-
ism of his time; Veblen did not believe that self-sustaining business cycles 
could spontaneously taper off in an equilibrium state. This assertion can 
be related to his evolutionist conception of economic dynamics.
After presenting the cycle according to Veblen, it is now time to propose 
some interpretations. The following sections offer an interpretation of the 
theory of Veblen’s approach, the traditional categories of cycles–endoge-
nous/exogenous and real/monetary–providing a framework for this first 
step.
3. VEBLEN’S BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: 
ENDOGENOUS OR EXOGENOUS, REAL  
OR MONETARY?
According to certain classifications of business cycle theories, Veblen 
belongs to a group of economists who “place emphasis on factors other than on 
economic institutions” (Persons, 1926, p. 102). For the authors belonging to 
this group, “a specific disturbance, such as an unusual harvest or war... may upset 
the economic equilibrium and set into motion a sequence that will not be repeated 
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unless another specific disturbance occurs” (ibid.). From this perspective, Veblen’s 
explanation is an exogenous one. However, there are some reasons to 
believe that this assessment is quite unsuited. The least of these reasons is 
the inherent inconsistency that would lead the recognized major precur-
sor of the American School of Institutional Economics to rule out institu-
tional factors in economic phenomena.
It must first be remembered that for Veblen, the American crises of the late 
19th century were no longer really cyclical in the sense that the depres-
sion stages were becoming more numerous and close together. By separat-
ing the cycle into three stages, we can then examine each phase to see if 
it relates to an endogenous or exogenous mechanism. It can be separated 
into 1) disturbing factors, 2) accelerating factors, and 3) limiting factors–
all of them inducing business cycles. According to Veblen’s conception, the 
first factor and (to a certain extent) the third rely on external factors, but 
the second one is of an internal type. Thus, the disturbing factor initiating 
the descending phase of the cycle is a fall in prices because of the techni-
cal progress. Where does technological change come from? Veblen did not 
explain this by economic causes, he regarded it as an anthropological phe-
nomenon: human beings, in their relationship with their environment, 
always seek to improve their living conditions by producing technologies. 
Other external factor Veblen underlined include the representation of the 
economic actors or the private or public interventions which can stop the 
deepening crisis. Then, exogenous factors in Veblen’s analysis are ulti-
mately limited to the initial impulsion behind price increases at the onset 
of prosperity and the limiting factors during the depression. However, the 
self-reinforcing process in both inflationist and deflationist stages and its 
exhaustion attest that Veblen’s type of business cycle theory is dominated 
by an endogenous approach.
A second criterion of business cycle theory classification has to do with 
whether business cycles are real or monetary. As an example, Hansen dis-
tinguished three types of business cycles theories: the capitalistic econ-
omy school, the exchange economy school–both analyzing the cycle in real 
terms–and the money economy school. On the one hand, it is recognized 
that Veblen’s theory places emphasis on money and credit (Parker-Foster 
and Ranson, 1987) and thus gets classified as the third type (Hansen, 1927). 
On the other hand, it has also been outlined that, according to Veblen’s 
theory, technical progress is a key determinant of economic mechanisms 
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(Sweezy, 1958). On the basis of this latter point, Veblen’s theory would be 
classified as the real economy type.
It must be stressed at once that Veblen’s cycle theory does not involve so 
much monetary policy or the money market that, for example, the inter-
est rate would be a trigger for the crisis. But the change in interest rates is 
rather a consequence of what happens in the credit market and in profit 
expectations. So, what can be considered as monetary in the analysis of 
Veblen is the significance of the effects of indebtedness on the course of 
the cycle and businessmen’s habits of thought, focusing more on nominal 
value than on real value (quantities or volume) 3. While both money and 
technology are indeed important, it is precisely their conflicting combi-
nation that takes place within economic fluctuations. It can be argued 
that the dichotomy between “pecuniary employment” and “industrial employ-
ment”, described in Veblen’s theory of the firm (Veblen, 1921), can be con-
ceived as a possible microfoundation of its macroeconomics. Veblen claims 
then that in the modern economic system, “money values are the final reality 
of things” (ibid., p. 183). He stated that the business cycle depends on legal-
economic system institutions running through the money/credit mecha-
nism governing the technological processes of production, but also on dis-
tribution, individual exchange and market processes. In particular, the 
general use of credit is a factor of discrepancy between real and nominal 
values. In the course of business cycles, value fluctuation is the primary 
effect, merely exerting a secondary and remote effect on the volume of 
industrial production, which then fluctuates less and only as a reaction. 
In the optimistic phase of the cycle, marked by an increase in prices and 
anticipated revenues, the use of credit to finance investments and exter-
nal growth contributes to the general increase in prices and firms’ capital-
ization. Then, the prosperity phase, the expansion of credit first leads to 
inflation: “An immediate consequence of the mobilization of savings by corporation 
finance, therefore, will be an inflation of general prices, a depreciation of the currency” 
(Veblen, 1923, p. 87). Secondly, this increase in credit, although inflation-
ist, has little effect on business earnings, since the return for the financial 
capitalist is deduced from the profit of the industrial capitalist (Phillips, 
1987). Thirdly, this extension of credit increases as much as industrial pro-
duction. Credit is sought less as regards physical property, as opposed to 
3 For example, the conception of value and its criticism of economics on value can be 
found in Brette 2016.
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securities (which specifically indicate indebtedness). Loans of all types are 
a duplication of credit based upon the same underlying material items and 
exert no direct effect on industry, except to inflate values: “Loan credit in 
excess of what may serve to transfer the management of industrial materials from the 
owner to a more competent user... serves, on the whole, not to increase the quantity of 
the material means of industry nor, directly, to enhance the effectiveness of their use; 
but taken in the aggregate, it serves only to widen the discrepancy between business 
capital and industrial equipment” (Veblen, 1904, pp. 104-105).
Furthermore, depression and crisis are fundamentally monetary and 
financial phenomena. “It is in business that depression is felt... it is also in busi-
ness (pecuniary) terms that the depression is measured” (ibid., p. 213). Depression 
first impacts business, and only afterwards the workforce, especially by 
unemployment. Indeed, the fall in wages is temporized by falling prices, 
until bankruptcies have a real effect on employment. Production volumes 
fluctuate less than prices and capitalization values. The crisis “leaves the 
business men collectively poorer, in terms of money value; but the property which they 
hold between them may not be appreciably smaller in point of physical magnitude or 
of mechanical efficiency than it was before the liquidation set in” (ibid., p. 191). The 
crisis first affects intangible assets (capitalization values) and then tangi-
ble assets, but in the end the real stake of a crisis is the redistribution of 
industrial ownership.
Veblen’s commentary about the idea of an overproduction crisis perfectly 
expresses his point of view (Veblen, 1892). According to business, overpro-
duction implies a general production in excess of demand at remunerative 
prices, i.e., at “a price that will afford the customary profit on the capital invested”. 
Depression is distinguished by the fact that the average obtainable profit 
at the time the capital is invested falls short of the accepted standard: “The 
average rate of profit from past investments, indicated by the ratio of their earning 
capacity to their accepted capitalization, falls short of the accepted customary profit, 
indicated by the customary rate of interest on money seeking investment. The precise 
difficulty is that divergence has taken place between the accepted nominal value of 
property based on its past capitalization and its actual present value, indicated by its 
present earning capacity or the present cost of replacing it” (Veblen, 1892, p. 489).
Business shows reluctance in light of the readjustment in price scales 
imposed by the circumstances; profits continue to be evaluated on the 
basis of past nominal values. Moreover, “the characteristic fact in a case of 
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general overproduction is that the basis on which remunerative prices and customary 
profit are computed has become obsolete” (ibid., p. 490).
Technical progress now warrants mention, along with its specific effects 
on business cycles. According to Veblen, “the state of industrial arts... is no 
longer to be conceived as stationary” (Veblen, 1904, p. 228). A gradual, but 
steady, improvement in technical equipment should be noted in the field 
of production. This progress is incorporated by those categories of workers 
imbued with industrial habits of thought, e.g., engineers, and their value 
criteria (product quality, output level). Additionally, the effects of tech-
nical progress are disseminated throughout the industrial system, induc-
ing more efficiency in plants and production processes. Moreover, unit 
costs are likely to decrease under the influence of technological change. 
Yet with respect to business principles, technical change is more heavily 
associated with depression intensification. Admittedly, production costs 
and industrial equipment costs experience a decrease. However, during 
the depression phase, this decline is not as significant as the fall in earn-
ing capacity. Technical progress has contradictory effects upon the econ-
omy. Its beneficial impact, both technically and economically, on prices 
and productivity permeates the transactions that frame the industrial sys-
tem. Yet technical change is also an element of the differentiation in pro-
duction conditions between various generations of productive equipment. 
This time lag between technical and economic conditions is a discrimi-
natory element of competition. It is reinforced by credit contracts with 
fixed interest rates, which represent another cost differentiation factor 
between old and new industries. 
Veblen was not a monetarist, nor a crude materialistic thinker for that 
matter. In business cycles, monetary factors and industrial factors are 
intricate. In fact, the duality is rightly recognized as the inter-institu-
tional contradiction between “finance” and “industry”, which is central 
to his interpretation of business fluctuations. Industry and technology are 
controlled by pecuniary institutions by virtue of the nature of property 
rights and of firms’ governance. Nonetheless, technical progress is stead-
ily impeding the ascendancy of business, revealing its destabilizing prop-
erty in a market economy.
Veblen is also known for advocating for an evolutionary economics that 
is directed towards explaining economic dynamics rather than analyzing 
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equilibrium. Institutional analysis itself is interested in change, but also 
in inertia effects. The last section will propose an interpretation of the 
business cycle in light of Veblen’s evolutionist mechanisms. We will make 
a parallel between some more contemporary research concerning the 
analysis of the endogenous emergence of systemic risk in a credit network 
economy and Veblen’s insights. However, we will show that some specific 
ideas still distinguish Veblen’s conception.
4. VEBLEN AND MULTI-AGENT SIMULATIONS 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES: A RETROSPECTIVE 
APPROACH
To establish one of the possible comparisons between Veblen’s business 
cycle theory and contemporary economics, we have chosen two agent-
based models as examples, which defend that the structure of aggregate 
behavior (macro) emerges from the interactions among a population of 
agents (micro). Delli Gatti et alii (2006) and Battiston et alii (2012) thus pro-
pose two models as an extension of Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), which 
formalizes modern crises from the point of view of business fluctuations 
in a credit network. The main idea is that in modern economy, agents 
are linked by productive and credit relationships; the behavior of one 
agent then influences the behavior of the others through network con-
nections. Moreover, credit contracts establish connections among (1) com-
mercial banks (interbank markets), (2) firms and banks (loans market), 
and (3) among customers and suppliers (goods markets). Delli Gatti et alii 
consider how their conception should be differentiated from the mod-
els which focus on bank runs and financial contagion on interbank mar-
kets (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or asset price contagions (Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997, 2002). According to Delli Gatti et alii, credit networks not only 
enable the diffusion of financial crises, but they also amplify them, then 
inducing systemic crises. The authors want to distinguish themselves 
from the perspective which sees interlocking credit exposure as a mean 
of risk diversification (Allen and Gale, 2001, 2005). According to this last 
perspective, “as the degree of connectivity increases above a certain threshold, cri-
ses tend to be not only more severe, but also more frequent” (Delli Gatti et alii, 
2006). Credit interlinkages among agents are a source of bankruptcy 
diffusion as “all in all, the bankruptcy in one sector can diffuse to other sectors 
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through linkages creating a vicious cycle and bankruptcy avalanches in the network 
economy” (ibid.).
An interesting issue is the distinction between two features of a credit 
network. The first one is the interdependence of agents’ financial condi-
tions. This is the mechanism at the origin of what can be labeled as the 
domino effect over the space. It defines what way a business cycle is linked 
to firm bankruptcies and how propagation appears because agents’ assets 
are other agents’ liabilities. The second mechanism is the financial accel-
erator, i.e., a positive financial feedback tending to deteriorate the situa-
tion of an agent over time. The bankruptcy in one sector can diffuse to 
other sectors through linkages, creating a vicious cycle and bankruptcies 
avalanches in the network economy. This second mechanism, which can 
be labeled the avalanche effect (or snowball effect), is due to the amplifica-
tion of the connections of the output of a firm on supply and payments 
with other firms and from firms-banks and firms-firms credits.
We can make comparisons with some of Veblen’s early ideas. The reasons 
for these comparisons are that these models’ analysis of crises is based 
on financial factors, such as credit relations, as in Veblen’s theory. A sec-
ond reason is that they are self-sustaining disequilibrium models, which 
is also the case for Veblen. Then, Veblen’s conception has common features 
with these multi-agent models. First, Veblen considers that, in the ascend-
ing and declining phases of the cycle, there is a diffusion effect by the 
spread of price in the exchanges or credits, which is differentiated accord-
ing to the position of the agent (industrial firms) with respect to the ori-
gin of the disturbance: this is the domino effect, which runs along the nexus 
of agents. This is an effect associated with competition and credit scaffold-
ing, which in deflation have an agent to agent effect–for example, firms 
disadvantaged by technical progress go to bankruptcy in chain.
Second, there also exists an acceleration effect amplifying initial dis-
turbance and depending on expected gains or losses and their amplified 
effects on capitalization and market value. For example, in times of depre-
ciation of assets, the sale of shares by a shareholder causes a new devalua-
tion, new sales and a new devaluation in return: this is the avalanche effect.
These effects refer to Veblen’s well-known evolutionary ideas about the 
dynamics of economic processes in terms of “cumulative-causation”. But 
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Veblen also considered that there was an important inertia effect that 
affected the diffusion and prevented against equilibrating mechanisms 4. 
This inertia is related to the specific effects of time lag and to commit-
ments associated with contracts. First, in the process involved in the cri-
sis, there was a change occurring in nominal value between the time of 
production and the time of sales, affecting profit expectations and then 
capitalization. Another phenomenon attributable to time is the delay in 
the diffusion of technical change, which negatively affects the condi-
tions of competition, prices and interest rates for the oldest industries. Of 
course, there are mainly the obligations linked to the credits contracted 
on the previous valuation basis, which has, in the meantime, deteriorated. 
When interest rates decline, these commitments at a higher rate weigh 
heavily on firms, whose share of debt increases in the overall (new) value 
of assets.
The first and the third mechanisms, diffusion and inertia are dominant 
in real exchanges (goods) and credit relationships, while the second–accel-
eration–is more specific to the financial phenomenon of anticipations 
and economic property evaluated on immaterial assets. Then, according 
to Veblen, the institutional context, legal and habitual, determines what 
type of mechanism will prevail.
A second lesson from Veblen’s business cycle theory–like agent-based mod-
els–is that it rejects the concept of economic equilibrium. According to 
Mitchell, “Veblen differs from most writers in holding that, once begun, business 
depression tends to perpetuate itself, instead of tending to produce a resumption of 
activity” (Mitchell, 1927, p. 80). In his business cycle theory, Veblen’s evolu-
tionism is expressed by the fact that a return to equilibrium is not a natu-
ral tendency of the economy and that economic trends do not always reveal 
efficiency. More precisely, Veblen’s “cumulative causality” and “institu-
tional inertia”, which are the equivalent mechanisms of “path depend-
ency” and “lock-in phenomena” in some contemporary evolutionary eco-
nomics, are of great importance by virtue of the fact that the return to 
equilibrium does not occur endogenously. As Hansen summarized, “in an 
individualistic, competitive economy there is good ground for believing that society 
cannot adjust itself to the time lags inherent in our capitalistic and money economy, 
4 This dynamics, cumulative process and inertia bring to mind Harrod’s. See Dockès, 
“The high theory, the dynamics, the cycle (1926-1946)” (Dockès, 2017, pp. 752-811).
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and so the oscillations once started, tend to perpetuate themselves” (Hansen, 1927, 
p. 119). A process of disequilibrium propagation is thereby driving business 
dynamics. This propagation or self-reinforcing process extends through-
out the interdependent industrial system, the credit “pyramid” and all 
exchange transactions. Furthermore, this process of dissemination goes 
beyond expectations molded by “pecuniary habits of thought”, agent 
“reluctance”, which prevent against price flexibility or institutions that 
bolster the driving forces behind prices.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we will recall the main points of originality in Veblen’s busi-
ness cycle theory. If we take the usual typology (exogeneous/endogenous 
and real/monetary), it can first be stated that in Veblen’s theory, exoge-
nous shocks are amplified by endogenous factors of propagation through 
industrial and credit networks, and by acceleration through anticipations 
and institutions that are particular to market finance. If we look at the 
respective importance of real and monetary factors, both intervening in 
the process, we can assume that, according to Veblen, it is determined 
by the nature of institutions and its implementation in the control of 
the firm. And – as it seems today – the historical period of reference for 
Veblen was characterized by the growth, and even the prevalence, of mon-
etary and financial factors. Nevertheless, a special mention must be given 
to technical progress. Although it could appear as exogenous, it depends 
on anthropological and cultural facts ultimately explaining the social and 
economic evolution. Veblen considered that innovation could be controlled 
by institutional patterns, which were enabled by market finance in mod-
ern capitalism. Finally, Veblen’s conception echoes with contemporary 
market finance and innovation relationships, which could be labeled “liai-
sons dangereuses”, using Laclos’ formula, as in Battiston et alii’s previously 
quoted paper (Battiston et alii, 2012). Accordingly, these connections have 
been the main determinant of contemporary phases of growth, crises 
and downturn since the 1990’s, and the well-known institutional changes 
occurring can be compared with those analyzed by Veblen the end of the 
19th century.
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